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Ifwe don't do something about the high cost
ofdoing business in space, and do itsoon, our
nation's space program isin deep trouble.We
are on the verge of exciting new discoveries
in space science, but we cannot follow
through as rapidly as we should because we
can'tafford it.We see before us many impor-
tant space applications,but we cannot move
out as rapidly as we should because we can't
afford it.Most important of all,we may lose
our hard-won worldwide leadership in space,
ifwe don't find a way to do more for our mon-
ey! To put itanother way, we are doing less
than we should do in space because things
are so expensive, and because we are work-
ing under very tight budgetary constraints.
There is very littlewe can do about the
budget--it isimposed by external forces,and
there are many other pressures on it;but
there is a great deal we can do about costs.
Doing something about the high costofdoing
business in space is today's biggest chal-
lenge.
Basically, when we started out in this busi-
ness 14 years ago, launch costs were overrid-
ingly important. We crammed everything we
could into each launch, and optimized our
satellitesfor low weight, low volume and
high performance. Payload costswere clearly
secondary considerations. This resulted in
spacecraft tailor-made for each mission, with
its own customized subsystems and compo-
nents. Every piece was designed to the limit,
with low margins and low tolerances. The
net result was that most systems could be
used only forthe purpose forwhich they were
originallyintended, and after use in one sat-
ellite,were discarded in favor ofnew systems
designed for the next mission. Furthermore,
the low design tolerances required a tremen-
dous number of testsand enormous volumes
of paperwork to achieve absolute control.In
other words, we were forced to perform very
expensive developments and then used the
spacecraft only once or twice before starting
on the next very expensive development. We
have built many one-of-a-kind items, and
have demanded the utmost in performance
from them. Simple statisticsbear this out.
Today we have 52 operating civilian space-
craft.By the end of next year we will launch
35 more, for a totalof 87. These 87 represent
43 different spacecraft types---on the average
each spacecraft is flown only twice!
But things are different now. Payloads have
become more complex, while launch costs
have come down... This means that we
should now optimize our payloads for low
cost and high reliability, and not for mini-
mum weight and maximum performance as
we did in the past. I am convinced that if we
do this, we can drastically reduce the coat of
doing business in space. And this, I believe,
is as great a technological challenge as ev-
erything else that we have done in space...
In the design phase, the following principles
are important:
Don't re-invent the wheel. Use the best
that is available from other programs. In
all of the commercial firms I have visited,
"not invented here" is unheard of. All tear
down their competitor's product, study it,
analyze it, cost it and make use of the best
ideas in it, as long as they do not infringe
on patent rights.
Standardize. This applies to parts, compo-
nents, modules, subsystems and entire
systems. (There are only two chassis for
the entire line of Sears television sets,
and even they contain many common
modules.)
• Design for low cost. Involve production
engineers in the earliest stages of design
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to help eliminate those things that will be
difficult to produce.
Design to minimize testing and paper-
work. Simply stated, this means: take ad-
vantage of reduced weight and volume
constraints and use standard parts, larger
margins, and larger safety factors. (In
Apollo we spent millions of dollars--on
tests and paper--to be sure we did not ex-
ceed the "fracture mechanics" limits on
our pressure vessels. A few extra pounds
in tank weights would have completely
eliminated that problem, and the testing
and paperwork along with it.)
Recognize that different systems can ac-
cept differing degrees of risk... A Shuttle
life support system must be more reliable
than a simple experiment in the Shuttle
payload bay. The cost of a system should
reflect the acceptance of risk in those in-
stances where this is possible.
Know your costs. None of the things I
have said has any meaning if we don't
know how much each element costs. The
area of accurate cost estimating is one
where we have a great deal to learn. Yet
it is an area which has been developed.
Trade features for cost. This follows natu-
rally from the previous item. Once we
know how much something costs, then we
can ask ourselves whether it is really
worth it. Many of our so-called "require-
ments" really aren't that firm, and should
be stated as "goals," to be re-examined in
terms ofcost.
Pay particular attention to the few very
high-cost items. In many designs some
small percentage of the items amount to
most of the costs. By knowing the costs,
and by listing items in order of descend-
ing costs, it becomes possible to devote a
great deal of attention to the high-cost
items--generally with profound results.
In the implementation phase, I would em-
phasize the following points:
Know your costs before you start. This per-
haps is the most fundamental of all re-
quirements. Without exception, the
NASA programs which have been in diffi-
culty were the ones that had insufficient
definition at the outset.
Set firm cost targets. A desire for the "low-
est possible cost" is not a good way to ap-
proach the job. A firm and absolute cost
ceiling should be established for each job.
Meet the established cost targets. Don't
blame cost growths above target on "ex-
ternal forces." Find ways to meet the tar-
gets, no matter what happens. This
means that we have to become more pro-
ductive in one area, if another area exhib-
its an "unavoidable" cost increase.
In summary, we must find ways to design for
lower costs, we must know our costs, and we
must set out to meet those costs...
In my years in the space program, and espe-
cially during the years when I had some first-
hand experience as a project manager, I
gained a tremendous respect for American
industry... That industry rose to the chal-
lenge of Sputnik in 1957, and brought us to a
position of world leadership in space. Today
that same industry faces a new challengem
the challenge of doing more for less money.
It is up to you to apply the same skills, inge-
nuity and competitive spirit that allowed us
to meet the challenge of 1957 to now meet
the challenge of the 1970s--to preserve U.S.
leadership in space through a productive pro-
gram at a price the nation can afford.
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